Every party that touches the data
This is the list from our Trust Center, reproduced here so a reviewer working through a Gulf questionnaire does not have to go looking. We give advance notice of material changes to it.
| Criterion | Purpose | Country |
|---|---|---|
| Supabase | Database, authentication, storage | United States |
| Vercel | Application hosting and CDN | United States |
| Hetzner | Document processing, transient | Germany |
| Anthropic | AI responses | United States |
| Voyage AI | Text embeddings | United States |
| Stripe | Payments, billing data only | United States |
| Resend | Transactional email | United States |
| Twilio | SMS and WhatsApp invitations | United States |
| OAuth sign-in | United States |
Read that list as a Gulf compliance officer would. Deal content leaves the United States only for transient processing in Germany, and it reaches two US AI providers as part of answering questions. Our Trust Center states that this content is not retained by those providers and is never used to train models. If sending deal content to a US AI provider under any terms is disqualifying for your mandate, that is a clean reason to stop reading.
What happens to a document
- UploadTLS 1.3 in transit, into a private bucket. United States
- ProcessParsed and chunked, transient, not stored at rest. Germany
- IndexEmbeddings generated by a US provider, stored with the room
- ViewServer-resolved permission, watermark burned in, view written to the log
Encryption is AES-256 at rest and TLS 1.3 in transit. Buckets are private and never publicly readable, so a document URL is not a credential. Every view is written to a SHA-256 hash-chained audit log whose integrity is verified on a schedule, which means tampering with the record is detectable rather than merely discouraged. You can export that log from your own room, so the record is something you verify rather than something we describe.
The question behind the question
Gulf security reviews have started asking where the AI permission check sits, which is the right question, because the same rule is either a control or theatre depending on the layer it lives in.
- In the system promptbypassable
Asking the model not to mention documents the user cannot see. A model can be argued out of an instruction.
- In application code, after retrievalbypassable
The rows already left the database. A mistake in the calling code returns them.
- Inside the SQL queryenforced
Filtered on tenant id and a per-participant document access function, so an unauthorised chunk is never read out.
- Row-Level Security in the databaseenforced
Tenant isolation enforced below the application, so an application bug cannot cross the boundary.
Proving who saw what
A residency question is usually a proxy for a leak question. Watermarks are burned into the page image on the server before encoding, tiled across the page, carrying participant name, email, IP and timestamp. Two participants viewing the same page receive different bytes. Delete every overlay element in the browser and the identity is still in the pixels, because it was never an overlay. The worst of 64 sampled 25 percent crops retained 11.7 percent of the watermark ink with all four fields legible, and the mark survives JPEG quality 50 and a 50 percent downscale.
Two things we will not soften
Chat history persists in your room. Some vendors say conversations are not stored. Ours are, on purpose, because a record with gaps in it is not an audit trail. What our Trust Center states separately is that content is not retained by our AI providers and is never used to train models.
And the honest summary of the residency position is short. We can tell you precisely which country every subprocessor operates in and precisely what is logged. We cannot give you an in-region deployment, a certification badge, or a guarantee about where data sits, because we do not have any of the three. A vendor page that claims all of them is either a different product or a Trust Center you should read more slowly.
Who this is still right for
Cross-border processes where the counterparties are outside the region anyway. Fundraises, board portals and client portals where the constraint is confidentiality rather than jurisdiction. Deals where the documents are Arabic and Hijri-dated and no incumbent renders them properly, which is the problem the Saudi Arabia page measures, and the GCC page extends across the three-decimal dinars.
Plans are published and flat: free tier, Teams at $399 a month, Pro at $999 a month, custom Enterprise, with AI included rather than sold as an add-on and no per-page fees. The 14-day trial takes no credit card, so the cheapest way to test any of the above is to test it. See pricing, and /trust for the compliance table this page draws on.